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Abstract
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to identify the extent to which the company's post- 
initial public offering (IPO) outcome varies, along with the determinants of the post-IPO 
outcomes.
Design/methodology/approach - The authors use Cox proportional hazards models to 
examine what determines the company's post-IPO transition to one of the classified 
outcomes, delisting, acquisition due to strong performance, and acquisition due to weak 
performance. The authors develop models taking in a range of information concerning 
pre-IPO characteristics, offering characteristics, financial indicators, company specifics, 
industry features, and corporate ownership and governance.
Findings - Delisting is predominantly influenced by the company’ pre-IPO operating 
performance, as well as financial indicators and governance structure at the time of the 
IPO. Sound governance structure and good financial standing of the company aid it to 
achieve its goal. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of both forms are distinguished most 
significantly by ownership structure and industry features, which is consonant with the 
position that M&As are majorly motivated by social concerns and corporate control 
considerations. Centrally, corporate evolution is jointly shaped by market force and state 
control.
Practical implications - The findings can inform public policy decisions. There is a case 
for gradual introduction of institutional changes which facilitate, regulate, and monitor 
orderly market operations in line with the market mechanism and sound corporate 
governance.
Originality/value - The study is among the first efforts to examine what determines the 
company's transition to one of the post-IPO states following the IPO in China's stock 
market.
1 
The life cycle of initial public offering companies in China 
1. Introduction
Going public is an important new phase in the life cycle of a company during and beyond 
which it aspires to recycle more productively financial and physical resources (Liu et al., 
2013).  A body of literature investigates operating performance and stock returns following 
the initial public offering (IPO), and tends to indicate that companies underperform after the 
IPO relative to their pre–IPO performance (Jain and Kini, 1994; Wang and Deng; 2006; Chi et 
al., 2010).  Notably, Fama and French (2004) find a dramatic decline in the survival rates of 
newly listed companies over several decades.  These studies have directed increasing efforts 
in examining the survival and decline of IPO companies in their aftermarket. 
A number of studies consider the survivorship of new listings seeking to account for 
subsequent delisting or acquisition (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; Jain and Kini, 2008). Rising 
numbers of IPO’s have triggered increasing research into why some IPO companies easily 
become a takeover target (e.g., Liu et al., 2013).  One view holds that companies are delisted 
or acquired in the face of impending bankruptcy or violation of exchange regulation (De and 
Jindra, 2012).  A different position is that companies are delisted or acquired due to their 
potential value or superior performance (Chi et al., 2010).  In pursuit of their purpose, some 
studies endeavour to pinpoint predictive factors.  Focusing on the company decline, Rao 
(1989) notes that one reason for the decline with the time is that companies take excessive 
risk in their undertakings. Jain and Kini (1999) demonstrate that higher company risk 
increases the probability of not surviving while reducing the probability of being acquired. 
Peristiani and Hong (2004) argue that the companies with negative pre–IPO earnings are three 
times more likely to be dropped from an exchange than profitable ones.  Some studies find 
that outdated technology and lack of production focus threaten the company’s continuity and 
hence its survival (Henning and Lu, 2000; Hovey and Li, 2009).  With respect to acquisition, 
Palepu (1986) and Theodossiou et al. (1996) note that inefficiently managed companies are 
popular acquisition candidates because of their lower comparable profitability and probable 
financially distressed condition. Peel and Wilson (1989) and Gilson (1989), however, find that 
good performing companies are frequently subject to hostile targets and that the decision to 
acquire a distressed company is based mainly on synergistic grounds and the extent of 
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financial distress of a company. Using an integrated approach, Jain and Kini (1994) consider 
what determines whether a company survives independently, fails outright, or becomes the 
subject of an acquisition after going public, and conclude that IPO features, industrial 
structure and corporate strategies determine the transition states. These above studies consider 
these issues from the issuer’s perspective. 
A growing literature examines corporate evolution following the IPO from the investor’s 
perspective. Goergen (1998) and Mikkelson et al. (1997) examine the development of 
corporate ownership following the IPO with focus on shareholdings and board representation 
of venture–capital backers and identify the dynamic relationship between company 
performance and corporate ownership and governance structure.  Other aspects of corporate 
governance of IPO companies, such as executive pay, have received some attention from 
researchers (Baker and Gompers, 2003).  Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) focus on the role of 
corporate governance in increased M&A activity in a 20–year period of their study.  Ang et al. 
(2000) note that managerial ownership reduces agency costs leading to value creation.  
Agency problems, however, are not restrained when there is a lack of independent directors, 
leading to company decline (Yermack, 1996; Dennis and McConnell, 2003).  In the case of 
China, Wei et al. (2005) suggests that state shareholdings increase the tendency toward 
company decline.  The opposite view holds that state ownership may facilitate company 
performance and thus enhance shareholder value (Wang and Deng, 2006).  Guo and Brooks 
(2009) find evidence to support that state–owned shares are offered in a positive market 
sentiment. Concerning corporate governance attributes, Li and Cui (2003) contend that 
independent directors in China find it difficult to fulfill their monitoring role, because the 
boards are typically dominated by insiders and hardly have any outsider presence. By contrast, 
Chen et al. (2006), Wang and Deng (2006) and Zhao (2006) find that independent directors in 
China play a positive role in company performance. 
Yet despite the progress thus far, previous studies are subject to a number of limitations which 
bring the studies’ findings into question. These shortcomings relate most notably to the 
limited financial outcomes, truncated observation period, and narrow sets of determinants. 
First, early studies treat companies experiencing different post-IPO outcomes as a 
homogenous group.  They do not distinguish the companies acquired due to favourable as 
opposed to unfavourable reasons (e.g., Chi et al., 2010; Jain & Kini, 1994; 1999).  Companies, 
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however, are likely to get acquired prior to a period of either strong or weak performance. 
These studies can potentially lead to an inaccurate inference with respect to identification and 
explanation of the company’s post-IPO status.  Second, earlier studies have little 
consideration of dynamic evolution of the company over its life cycle, which limits the 
perspective of each developing stage of the company (Bai et al., 2002; Fan et al., 2007). They 
treat the status of the company as fixed rather than evolving.  Third, the company evolves to a 
definite state not on a random basis, but on the basis of both the issuer’s perspective, such as 
the issuer’s financial performance and industry features, and the investor’s perspective, such 
as corporate ownership and governance. Earlier studies have overlooked some, if not all, of 
these perspectives that arguably contribute to the differences in the companies’ evolution in 
their aftermarket. 
The purpose of this study is to fill this gap in the literature by identifying the extent to which 
the company’s post–IPO outcome varies, along with the determinants of the post–IPO 
outcomes. We address these issues from three perspectives. First, we extend previous studies 
of the post–IPO market and operational performance to three distinct post–IPO outcomes, 
namely, delisting, acquisition due to strong performance, and acquisition due to weak 
performance. Second, to examine the dynamic corporate evolution, we adopt Cox 
proportional hazards model which utilizes information available prior to, at and post to the 
IPO to predict the probability of subsequent transition to one of these three post–IPO states.  
Third, we track down the effects of a set of variables representing both issuer’s and investor’ 
perspectives on the company’s trajectory following the IPO. Specifically we examine the 
impacts of factors representing the issuer’s perspectives, such as firm traits, financial 
indicators and industry structure, and analyze the relative importance of these factors in 
underpinning the three post–IPO outcomes. Given the unique feature of market operations in 
China, we also incorporate the investor’s perspectives represented by corporate ownership and 
governance mechanism into survival functions. This new addition allows us to assess to what 
extent the investor’s perspectives are attributed to corporate evolution, in particular in a 
market where the investor’s interests are knowingly largely ignored. 
Our contribution to the literature consists firstly in presenting understanding of the impacts of 
a range of the variables concerning pre–IPO characteristics, offering characteristics, financial 
indicators, company specifics, industry features, and corporate ownership and governance, 
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which appear to act so as to distinguish the outcomes of IPOs.  Specifically, carrying out this 
examination by reference to an important emerging market, our study adds significant 
evidence for emerging markets to the IPO literature, and sheds light on the importance of 
institutional infrastructure and functions in shaping the company’s post–IPO trajectories.  
Secondly, we adopt a dynamic approach by way of Cox hazard proportional model to examine 
the corporate evolution following the IPO using the full firm–year observations for each 
company.  In practical terms, our findings can inform public policy decisions relating to 
institutional infrastructure and functions as well as pointing to possible effects of ownership 
and corporate governance decisions connected with planning and shaping a company’s post–
IPO outcome. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses methodological issues, 
and develops research questions. Section 3 presents empirical findings and discussions. 
Section 4 concludes with policy recommendations. 
 
2. Methodological issues 
2.1. Sample description and constructing firm groups 
We construct a sample of IPOs on China’s stock market for the period of 1998–2008. We 
extract our sample from the GTA database
1
. All the non–financial companies, including both 
A–shares and B–shares, are included in this study. The companies are of different sizes and 
are distributed across 12 types of industry.   
We examine three post–IPO outcomes: delisting, acquisition due to strong performance, and 
acquisition due to weak performance. Based on the three outcomes, we classify companies 
into three groups: independent companies, delisted companies, and M&A companies. 
Independent companies refer to those that have not experienced any of these outcomes until 
2008 when the data is censored, and they will be used as the control group in this study.  
Delisted companies refer to those whose listing has been terminated on the stock exchange 
                                                        
1.  The data source of this study are gained from Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co., Ltd, including 
China Special Treatment and Particular Transfer Share Research Database (CSMAR-STPT), CSMAR China 
Stock Market Financial Database (Annual Report), China Corporate Governance Research Database, 
CSMAR China Stock Market Trading Database, China Stock Market Initial Public Offering Research 
Database, and China Listed Companies Merger & Acquisition, Asset Restructuring Research Database.  
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due to negative reasons.  M&A companies refer to those whose 50 percent of shares or above
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are acquired by an existing listed public company or a private company.  A listed company 
can become an acquisition target before a period of either strong or weak performance. We 
further classify M&A companies into two sub–groups – companies that have been acquired 
due to strong performance prior to acquisition (S–M&A) and companies that have been 
acquired due to weak performance prior to acquisition (W–M&A). An M&A company is 
defined as W–M&A if it meets the following criterion: the return on assets of the company 
decreases for three consecutive years prior to the acquisition.  Any other companies in the 
M&A group are defined as S–W&A.  The observation time period comprises three years 
before the company goes public until the year when one of the outcomes occurs or the closing 
year of this study, whichever is earlier.   
The final sample consists of 1,499 independent companies, 63 delisted companies, and 56 S–
M&A companies, and 132 W–M&A companies for the analysis, with 19,250 evaluable firm–
year observations for the study period from 1998 to 2008. 
 
2.2. Variables selection and research question  
We include six sets of variables concerning pre–IPO characteristics, offering characteristics, 
financial indicators, company specifics, industry features, and corporate ownership and 
governance in predicting the trajectories following the IPO. Specifically, pre–IPO 
characteristics include operating return on assets and operating cash flow over assets prior to 
the IPO. Characteristics specific to issuance include IPO offering size, IPO risk, and IPO 
initial return. Financial indicators include return on assets, current ratio, leverage ratio, and 
book–to–market ratio. Firm–specific characteristic variables include company size, company 
age and agency costs. Variables representing industry features include high–technological 
activities and industry sector in which the company operates.  Industry sector is further 
divided into four sub–sectors: Utilities, Properties, Industrials, and Commerce. Corporate 
ownership and governance variables include ultimate state ownership, board size, 
CEO/chairman duality, and board independence. Table 1 summarizes the categories and their 
associated variables including the definitions. 
                                                        
2.  According to Article 84 of the “Administration Measures on Takeover of Listed Companies”, approved at the 
180th Chairman’s Meeting of the CSRC on May 17, 2006, an investor has controlling right of a listed 
company if being the controlling shareholder of the acquired listed company with over 50% of its shares. 
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Our range of variables sets out to distinguish the antecedents of the situation from its intrinsic 
characteristics at the time of the IPO; also to distinguish the overall corporate dimension from 
characteristics of the issue itself; and finally to cover a set of variables which focuses on the 
investor’s perspective.  This set–up leads us to the following formal research questions:  is it 
possible to identify the relative influence exerted by specified issue, issuer, corporate, 
financial, ownership and governance, and contextual factors on the occurrence of specified 
outcomes following an IPO?  What factors most powerfully determinate the company’s post–
IPO outcome in its aftermarket? 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
2.3. Empirical specifications 
Unlike logistic models which assume that the underlying failure process remains fixed over 
time, survival analysis pertains to a statistical approach designed to take into account the time 
between entry into observation and a subsequent event and captures dynamic trajectories in 
the real world. Events estimated by survival analysis are defined by a transition from one 
discrete state to another at a consecutive moment. A popular model used in survival analysis is 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model which assesses the importance of time–varying covariates in 
the survival times of each individual company through the hazard function. The advantage of 
this approach is that it accepts censored data as far as a failure event is concerned, and allows 
estimates of failures over any future time horizon (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005). Thus, Cox 
model incorporates time–varying covariates or explanatory variables that change with time 
(Liu et al., 2013). 
In this study, we adopt the Cox hazard model to examine the probability of the company’s 
transitioning to one of the post-IPO states, namely delisting, acquisition due to strong 
performance, and acquisition due to weak performance.  The Cox hazard analysis utilizes the 
coefficients of explanatory variables to estimate the probability of outcome occurrence and to 
derive predicted hazard functions for testing the hypothesized relations between the 
probability of outcome occurrence and the set of explanatory variables.  The hypothesized 
relation between the post–IPO outcomes and the explanatory variables are expressed below: 
Cox(S–M&Ait=1∣Xit) = β11OPRAit + β12OCFAit + β13OFFSIZEit + β14RISKit + β15RETURNit  + 
β16ROAit + β17CURit + β18LEVit + β19B/Mit + β110SIZEit +β111AGEit + β112AGENit + β113INDUSit + 
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β114TECHit + β115ULTIit + β116DUALit + β117BOARDit + β118INDEPit                                                      (1) 
 
Cox(W–M&Ait=1∣Xit) = β21OPRAit + β22OCFAit + β23OFFSIZEit + β24RISKit + β25RETURNit  + 
β26ROAit + β27CURit + β28LEVit + β29B/Mit + β210SIZEit +β211AGEit + β212AGENit + β213INDUSit + 
β214TECHit + β215ULTIit + β216DUALit + β217BOARDit + β218INDEPit                                                     (2) 
 
Cox(Delistedit=1∣Xit) = β31OPRAit + β32OCFAit + β33OFFSIZEit + β34RISKit + β35RETURNit  + 
β36ROAit + β37CURit + β38LEVit + β39B/Mit + β310SIZEit +β311AGEit + β312AGENit + β313INDUSit + 
β314TECHit + β315ULTIit + β316DUALit + β317BOARDit + β318INDEPit                                                      (3)                                  
 
where S–M&Ait represents the status of being acquired due to strong performance; W–M&Ait 
represents the status of being acquired due to weak performance; and Delistedit represents the 
status of being delisting. S–M&Ait, W–M&Ait and Delistedit are the dependent dummy 
variable in Equation 1, Equation 2 and Equation 3, respectively. Xit is a vector of the 
covariates to be estimated for company i in year t.    is a vector of the regression coefficients.  
Hazard ratio (HR) has a positive value.  A negative coefficient, i.e., 1HR , indicates that the 
explanatory variable increases the probability of outcome occurrence. A positive coefficient, 
1HR , suggests that the explanatory variable accelerates outcome occurrence and increases 
the company’s probability of transitioning to one of the post–IPO states. When the estimated 
HR is unity, i.e., ,1HR  the company’s post–IPO state is unresponsive to the specific 
explanatory variable.  
 
2.4. Basic statistics 
Table 2 reports mean and median values of the explanatory variables for the three post–IPO 
outcomes and the results of pairwise comparisons between these outcomes. We employ the 
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney Test to examine whether there are differences in distributions 
between the three groups of companies. Several significant differences between each pairs of 
groups stand out. 
Prior to the IPO, companies with the delisting status display the lowest performance profile at 
the 1% level. In comparison, companies with the S–M&A status are highest in pre–IPO 
operating performance at the 10% level. The initial results suggest that lower pre–IPO 
performance may lend companies to an increased risk of subsequent delisting in their 
aftermarket, while companies with strong operating performance prior to the IPO may 
encounter a higher likelihood of getting acquired. 
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With respect to offering characteristics, S–M&A companies have the largest offering size 
among the three groups, while the opposite holds for delisted companies.   These suggest that 
a larger offering reduces the chance of survival.  Companies with large amounts of free cash 
flow at managerial discretion have potentially greater agency costs of equity, as managers can 
use the cash in ways that may reduce shareholders’ value.  Further, S–M&A companies 
display the lowest level of risk, indicating that S–M&A companies with lower risk are less 
likely to lend themselves to being acquired.  IPO initial returns are predictably higher for 
delisted companies than for the other two M&A groups, while S–M&A companies tend to 
have lower initial returns than W–M&A companies.  Higher initial returns may be an 
indication of significant uncertainty and severe informational asymmetries inherent within the 
companies concerned. These observed differences suggest that IPO initial returns could be a 
predictor for future risk of delisting.  
There are significant differences in the company’s performance and financial status prior to 
the occurrence of the eventual outcomes.  S–M&A companies are significantly higher in 
return on assets, current ratios and book–to–market ratio, but lower in leverage ratio 
compared to delisted companies. Delisted companies display the lowest level of book–to–
market ratio among the three groups. This may suggest the possibility that low B/M ratio may 
be influenced by potentially unfavourable factors such as the existence of intangible assets 
prone to overvaluation or overvalued growth itself. 
Turning to company specifics, there is no significant difference in company size among the 
three groups. However, W–M&A companies tend to have longer history than S–M&A 
companies, while delisted companies have the longest history among the three groups. One 
possible explanation is that very few companies survive over time because company 
performance decreases with company age and that it does so at a diminishing rate. In terms of 
agency costs, there appears to be no significant discrepancy in agency costs among the three 
groups.  Further, 15.91% of W–M&A companies, 10.71% of S–M&A companies and 6.35% 
of delisted companies engage in high–tech activities.  
Concerning corporate ownership, distinctive patterns emerge. 78.49% of S–M&A companies 
are ultimately owned by the state compared to 76.07% for W–M&A companies and 48.96% 
for delisted companies. These are clear evidence to indicate that ultimately state ownership 
dominates in Chinese listed companies. It is also noted that companies with higher presence 
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of state ownership are more likely to encounter acquisition than delisting. Such an indication 
coincides with the recent stock–split reform where state–owned companies have been 
undergoing significant asset restructuring by way of mergers and acquisitions. 
With respect to corporate governance attributes, it appears that board size in delisted 
companies (9.84) is higher compared to S–M&A companies (9.44) and W–M&A companies 
(9.36).  CEO/Chairman duality is 16.58% in delisted companies, 14.39% in S–M&A 
companies, and 13.46% in W–M&A companies. There is, however, no significant difference 
in CEO/chairman duality across these groups.  Further, delisted companies have the lowest 
level of board independence (13.92%), while it is 22.16% for W–M&A companies and 
23.56% for S–M&A companies. The observed differences are suggestive of a potential role of 
board independence in shaping the company’s post–IPO outcome. In spite of the differences, 
listed companies in China, in general, have a low level of board independence. 
Overall, these results suggest a link between the company’s post–IPO outcomes and the 
characteristics of the issuer and the issue itself, as well as the antecedents and their intrinsic 
characteristics spanning corporate dimension.  To avoid muticollinearity of the variables in the 
estimation, we conducted correlation coefficient analysis
3
. The results show that 
multicollinearity is not a concern for the selected variables in our study, since all the 
correlation coefficients are below |0.80|.  We will accordingly test the validity of the above-
discussed observations using Cox hazard model in the analyses that follow. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
3. Empirical results  
We present three sets of the empirical results of the Cox regression analysis in Table 3.  S–
M&A outcome in Panel A, W–M&A outcome in Panel B, and delisting outcome in Panel C. 
Within each panel, Model 1 presents the basic model without corporate governance attributes 
and industry sector. Model 2 presents results that consider corporate governance attributes 
including CEO duality, board size and board independence. Model 3 presents results that 
consider corporate governance attributes and industry sector.  We identify some distinct 
patterns across the three post–IPO outcomes. 
                                                        
3. The descriptive statistics for these variables along with the correlation coefficients are available upon request. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
Pre–IPO Characteristics. Panel A of Table 3 shows that there is a positive relation between 
operating return/assets (OPRA) and the likelihood of the S–M&A status at the 10% level.  By 
contrast, Panel C shows that OPRA has a significant, negative impact on the likelihood of 
delisting (Model 1: 0.05; Model 2: 0.06; Model 3: 0.05, p<0.01). This is clear evidence to 
indicate that higher pre–IPO operating performance signifies companies’ ability to survive 
successfully in their aftermarket, and hence subjects companies to a less likelihood of 
delisting.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that operating cash flow over/assets has 
an impact on the post–IPO outcome, though correctly signed.  This indicates that this 
financial measurement does not constitute a good predictor for the company’s future 
performance. Overall, our results are broadly consistent with the findings of Jain and Kini 
(1999), Peristiani and Hong (2004) and Wang (2004).   
Offering Characteristics. There is significant evidence to suggest that large IPO offering size 
increases the likelihood of transitioning to the S–M&A status, while the opposite holds for the 
W–M&A outcome. The offering size, however, has little impact on the delisting state. Our 
finding is partly supported by several prior studies that large IPO offering size reduces the 
probability of being acquired due to weak performance (Ti, 2003; Hovey and Li, 2009). 
IPO risk generates a negative impact on the likelihood of acquisition due to strong 
performance. Further, higher company risk at the time of the IPO increases the likelihood of 
delisting in Model 1 and Model 3 at the 1% level, but reduces the likelihood of the S–M&A 
outcome (Panel A: Model 2: 0.47) at the 1% level. These results provide empirical evidence 
to support the argument that company risk at the time of the IPO accounts for the poor long–
run performance (Rao, 1989; Ritter, 1991), and increases the chance of delisting (Palepu, 
1986; Jain and Kini, 1999). Our results are consonant with the current China’s position that 
the stock market is increasingly volatile and is plagued with big bubbles, and companies find 
it particularly hard to remain viable in the volatile market.     
There is no evidence to suggest that IPO initial return is associated with the S–M&A outcome, 
but that it is positively associated with the likelihood of evolving to the W–M&A state (Panel 
B: Model 1: 1.09; Model 2: 1.04; Model 3: 1.11, p<0.01).  Further, companies with high 
initial returns are more likely to be delisted (Panel C: Model 1: 1.33; Model 2: 1.19; Model 3: 
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1.14, p<0.01). Our results are consonant with Chi et al.’s (2010) that there is a negative 
relationship between IPO initial return and company survival. Our findings highlight that 
volatility in offering price of the first trading day captures uncertainty in the valuation of IPOs.  
High initial returns to IPOs often lead to excessive demand for IPOs especially in China (Liu, 
et al., 2013), resulting in high uncertainty and thereby high incidence of delisting. 
Financial Indicators. The return on assets ratio (ROA) does not appear to set any effects on 
the likelihood of M&A outcomes of both forms in Panel A and Panel B.  However, ROA is 
negatively related to the likelihood of delisting (Panel C: Model 1: 0.80, p<0.01; Model 2: 
0.90, p<0.00; Model 3: 0.90, p<0.05). These are clear evidence to indicate that companies 
with weak profitability are more likely to be delisted from the stock market.  Current ratio 
generates a positive impact on the likelihood of the S–M&A outcome at the 10% level, while 
the opposite holds for W–M&A outcome at the 5% level. We did not find evidence that 
current ratio accounts for the company’s ability to survive.  Leverage ratio has a positive 
effect on the likelihood of the W–M&A outcome. This result is contrary to the majority of 
findings that high leverage tends to deter acquirers.  There is no evidence to suggest that 
leverage has an impact on delisting, though positively signed.  The B/M ratio has a significant, 
negative impact on the likelihood of transitioning to the W–M&A state at the 1% level.  One 
possible explanation is that under-performing companies with low B/M may be perceived as 
overpriced stocks by the market, thus deterring acquirers due to cost considerations. Likewise, 
the B/M ratio produces a negative impact on delisting.  This suggests the possibility to the 
effect that when companies accumulate large losses, book–market ratio may turn into negative; 
as such, the risk of financial distress increases as the ratio consistently decreases. Our result 
does not support Fama and French’s (1995) proposition that high (low) B/M companies may 
embody high (low) distress–risk. 
Company Specifics. The variables representing firm specifics are found significant. Company 
size displays a significant, positive relationship with the likelihood of both forms of M&A 
outcomes. These results provide evidence to the effect that that large companies, usually 
SOEs, are undergoing restructuring via asset carve–outs or asset exchange with their parent 
companies or with potential acquirers as a part of the government’s policy for restructuring 
state–owned enterprises.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that company size is 
associated with the likelihood of delisting.  The effects of company age are mixed.  Company 
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age is negatively associated with delisting, indicating that older companies are more capable 
to rejuvenate themselves in order to avoid the delisting consequence.  Company age, however, 
has no impact on the likelihood of both forms of M&A outcomes. 
Most notably, the variable representing agency costs has a significant, negative effect on the 
delisting and W–M&A outcomes. The significance of free cash flow is more marked for 
delisted companies (Panel C: Model 2: 3.38, p<0.01; Model 3: 3.00, p<0.05) than W–M&A 
companies (Panel B: Model 1: 1.56, p<0.10; Model 3: 1.43, p<0.10).  These results support 
the free cash flow hypothesis that when companies generate substantial free cash flows, the 
conflicts of the interests between managers and shareholders are intensified. Large cash flow 
induces agency problems by motivating managers to disgorge the cash or wasting it on non-
maximizing activities, hence damaging the company’s prospects for survival, or lending the 
company to an easy takeover target.  
Industry features. Industry specifics have distinct effects on the company’s post–market 
viability.  High–tech activities have a significant, positive impact on the S–M&A outcome at 
the 1% level, suggesting that better–performing companies with high–tech advantages are 
more attractive to acquirers relative to non–high technology companies, as such 
establishments have a potential to enhance acquirers’ competitiveness. To the contrary, 
companies engaging in high–tech activities are less likely to get delisted. These results are 
consistent with prior studies that innovative conditions at the industry level matters for the 
continuance of the company (Jain and Kini, 1999; Chi and Padgett, 2002; Demers and Joos, 
2006). 
Further, our results show that companies in the Utilities sector are less likely to experience 
delisting (Panel C: Model 3: 0.53, p<0.10). This is evidence to the effect that companies 
operating in the Utilities sector are monopoly in the market and hence face the least likelihood 
of delisting. By contrast, companies in the Industrials sector are confronted with a higher risk 
of delisting (Panel C: Model 3: 2.08, p<0.01). With respect to the M&A outcomes, companies 
operating in the Properties sector (Panel A: Model 3: 3.35; Panel B: Model 3: 3.38) and the 
Industrials sector (Panel A: Model 3: 1.64; Panel B: Model 3: 1.98) are most likely to 
experience both forms of M&A outcomes at the 1% level. These are consistent with the recent 
M&A moves in China that companies in these two sectors are increasingly engaged in vertical 
acquisitions targeting at the market share and occupying the dominant market position as 
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noted in Liu et al. (2013).  Further, we find contrasting effects on the M&A outcomes for 
companies operating in the Commerce sector.  These companies experience a lower likelihood 
of transitioning to the S–M&A status (Panel A: Model 3: 0.33, p<0.10) but a higher likelihood 
of transitioning to the W–M&A status (Panel B: Model 3: 1.50, p<0.10). Companies in the 
Commerce sector are relatively smaller–scaled and tend to operate in Wholesale, Retail Trade, 
Media, and Social Services.  Under–performing companies in these industries are cheaper to 
buy and thus attract acquirers.   
Corporate Ownership and Governance. Ultimate state ownership evinces instructively 
contrasting results for the three post–IPO outcomes. Ultimate state ownership generates a 
positive impact on the S–M&A outcome (Panel A: Model 1: 1.55; Model 2: 1.53; Model 3: 
1.54, p<0.10%).  Likewise, companies that are ultimately owned by the state are more likely 
to encounter the risk of experiencing the W–M&A outcome (Panel B: Model 1: 4.36; Model 2: 
4.18; Model 3: 3.38, p<0.01%).  Our results suggest that state–owned companies are more 
likely to get acquired regardless of the form of M&As. These findings coincide with the 
ongoing ownership structure reform, which encourages restructuring state–owned assets by 
way of asset carve–outs or asset exchange with their parent companies or with potential 
acquirers.  In so far as this is correct, our results are clear suggestion that state ownership is 
the vital factor in determining the M&A transactions in China.  
By contrast, ultimate state ownership generates a significant, negative effect on delisting 
(Panel C: Model 1: 0.67; Model 2: 0.44; Model 3: 0.45, p<0.01%). This is clear evidence to 
indicate that state–owned companies are less likely to face delisting.  Companies where state 
ownership is predominant often operate in the national strategic industrial sectors.  When they 
are in the perceived risk of being delisted, the government takes measures to protect state–
owned property rights by exercising political power to prevent these companies from being 
driven out of the market.  This is consistent with discussions of Bradford et al. (2013) and Liu 
and Pang (2009) that state shareholders have priority to a greater access to obtain the 
protection of the government. Large presence of state ownership in listed companies is 
derived from the economic, culture, political and legal environment of China. Due to 
corporate control considerations, the government is unlikely to disregard state–owned 
companies undergoing failures.  
There are some mixed effects of corporate governance measures at the time of IPO offerings.  
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CEO/chairman duality is positively related to the likelihood of the W–M&A outcome (Model 
3: 1.16, p<0.10%), supporting the agency hypothesis that duality compromises the board’s 
effectiveness in monitoring CEOs, leading to a worsening of company performance and hence 
increasing the chance of acquisition due to poor performance. We find contrasting effects of 
board size on the post–IPO outcomes. Board size has a negative impact on the likelihood of 
the S–M&A outcome (Panel A: Model 2: 0.97, p<0.10), but a positive effect on the W–M&A 
outcome (Panel B: Model 2: 1.06, p<0.01; Model 3: 1.04, p<0.05) and the delisting outcome 
(Panel C: Model 2: 1.11, p<0.01; Model 3: 1.13, p<0.01).  This is evidence to the effect that a 
larger board may be difficult to engage all directors in company affairs effectively so that they 
are able to candidly contribute to the company, thus increasing the likelihood of transitioning 
to the W–M&A and delisting states. 
With respect to board independence, Independent directors are weakly related to the 
likelihood of the W–M&A outcome (Panel B: Model 2: 0.01, p<0.10; Model 3: 0.02, 
p<0.10%). We did not find any significant effect of board independence on other post–IPO 
outcomes. Against the widely–held expectation for the role of board independence in 
shareholder value maximization, our result suggests that independent directors are yet to 
assume the monitoring role which helps align the interests of managers with those of share-
holders. Independent directors in mature markets focus more on solving agency problems 
while independent directors in China aim at protecting self-interests or engage in relation 
building (Kato and Long, 2006a).  In the meantime, many of them find it difficult to exert the 
significant influence other than figure influence on the company that they serve.  These results 
are of significance as they show that the basic element of independence must be fulfilled 
before the management consider increasing the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. 
4. Conclusion 
We examine what determines the company’s post–IPO transition to one of the classified 
outcomes, delisting, acquisition due to strong performance, and acquisition due to weak 
performance. We develop models taking in a range of information concerning the issuer’s 
perspective and the investor’s perspective. We find that the post–IPO trajectories are subject 
to the varying degrees of determination relating to the company’s pre–IPO and offering 
characteristics, financial indicators, company specifics, industry structure, and corporate 
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ownership and governance.  
Two key findings emerge.  First, delisting is predominantly influenced by the company’ pre–
IPO operating performance, as well as financial indicators and governance structure at the 
time of the IPO. The evidence indicates that profitability and healthy financial status are 
necessary prerequisites for survival as an independent business entity.  Failure to satisfy these 
criteria means, ultimately, that the company will disappear from the market scene.  Sound 
governance structure and good quality of IPO companies aid the companies to achieve this 
goal.  Second, M&As of both forms are distinguished most significantly by the company’ 
industry features and ownership structure. Our analyses suggest that industry structure affects 
efficiency and competition in the outcome.  Further, we find significant evidence that ultimate 
state ownership predominantly determines the M&A outcomes. This is consonant with the 
fact that M&As are majorly motivated by social concerns, protection of the stake of the state 
in corporate ownership, and corporate control considerations.  Centrally, corporate evolution 
is jointly shaped by market force and state control. 
Our study raises some policy issues that merit discussions. The results suggest that the 
trajectory leading to and following an IPO should not be trammeled so as to constrain 
economically beneficial decisions.  In particular, there is a case for gradual introduction of 
institutional changes which facilitate, regulate and monitor orderly market exit operations in 
line with the market mechanism and sound corporate governance.  Our study calls for the 
extension of the review of these aspects to other markets, given the widespread problems of 
its kind that gave rise to the economic crisis. 
We finally submit that our study raises issues for future research. State controls permeate 
corporate decisions. The market and its institutions are not yet operating in line with the 
market rules, and controlling shareholders can easily reap private benefits by maintaining 
their controlling position in the company. Not least can this militate against minority 
shareholders’ interests. Our findings confirm and reinforce the case for developing models of 
integrating corporate control with investors’ value in the aftermath of IPOs. Our work could 
be pursued into other corporate decisions.  For example, research into valuation and financing 
motives associated with mergers and acquisitions in China could benefit from our findings on 
the antecedents of M&As. A further step could be a comparative study with economies with a 
similar setup and might include the impact of a major change in regulation. 
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Table 1. Description of variables in the estimations 
          
Description 
 
 
Variable 
 
Definition and measurement 
Pre-IPO characteristics   
Pre-IPO operating return on assets  OPRA Operating income before taxes and depreciation 
scaled by total assets 
Pre-IPO operating cash flow/assets OCFA Operating cash flow scaled by total assets 
   
Offering characteristics   
IPO offering size OFFSIZE Natural logarithm of the offering size 
IPO risk RISK Standard deviation of daily return during the first 
30 trading days following public listing 
IPO initial returns RETURN The closing price on the first day of trading minus 
the offer price scaled by the offer price 
   
Financial indicators   
Return on assets ROA Net income over total assets 
Current ratio 
Leverage ratio  
CUR 
LEV 
Current assets over current liabilities 
Book value of debt divided by book value of equity 
Book-to-market ratio B/M Book value of equity divided by market 
capitalization of equity at the financial year-end 
   
Company specifics   
Company size 
Company age 
Agency costs 
SIZE 
AGE 
AGEN 
Natural logarithm of total assets  
The number of the year since incorporation 
Free cash flow over total assets. Free cash flow is 
calculated as cash flows from operations minus 
capital expenditure. 
   
Industry features   
Industrial sectors INDUS D1 - Utilities 
D2 - Properties 
D3 - Industrials 
D4 - Commerce 
High-tech activities  TECH A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
company is a high-tech company, and 0 otherwise 
   
Corporate ownership and governance    
Ultimate ownership ULTI A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
ultimate owner is the state, and 0 otherwise. 
CEO/chairman duality DUAL A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
chairman and CEO positions are held by the same 
person, and 0 otherwise 
Board size BOARD The number of members sitting on the board of 
directors 
Board independence   INDEP The proportion of independent directors on the 
board 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables in the estimations 
Variable 
Healthy 
Companies 
M&A Companies Delisted 
Companies 
Healthy 
vs 
S-M&A 
Healthy 
vs 
W-M&A 
Healthy 
vs 
Delisted S-M&A W-M&A 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Wilcoxon z Wilcoxon z Wilcoxon z 
OPRA 0.1229 
(0.1074) 
0.1288 
(0.1167) 
0.5891 
(0.1207) 
0.1039 
(0.0872) 
-1.885* -5.205*** 5.413*** 
OCFA 0.1079 
(0.1002) 
0.1167 
(0.1318) 
0.1389 
(0.1419) 
0.0470 
(0.0470) 
-0.678 -4.141*** 2.316** 
OFFSIZE 17.4362 
(17.5000) 
17.5600 
(17.5000) 
17.2852 
(17.3700) 
17.2139 
(17.2200) 
-0.280 5.430*** 7.232*** 
RISK 0.4634 
(0.2068) 
0.3678 
(0.2588) 
0.4825 
(0.2383) 
0.6126 
(0.2729) 
-4.248*** -6.925*** -5.615*** 
RETURN 2.2666 
(1.1636) 
2.0609 
(1.4500) 
2.9747 
(1.2955) 
3.7750 
(1.7534) 
-3.313*** -7.137*** -8.305*** 
ROA -0.0960 
(0.0333) 
0.0353 
(0.0422) 
0.0105 
(0.0306) 
-0.3109 
(0.0149) 
-4.264*** 2.851*** 7.011*** 
CUR 1.6643 
(1.2733) 
1.6704 
(1.3839) 
1.6771 
(1.3200) 
1.3370 
(1.0673) 
-2.332** -1.700* 7.764*** 
LEV 0.6806 
(0.3996) 
0.5470 
(0.3298) 
0.6578 
(0.4050) 
0.6717 
(0.3636) 
2.496** -1.509 0.976 
B/M 0.7260 
(0.3717) 
0.3905 
(0.3306) 
0.3709 
(0.3022) 
0.0943 
(0.2080) 
4.191*** 8.020*** 13.684*** 
SIZE 21.1454 
(21.0451) 
21.3767 
(21.3165) 
21.2004 
(21.0933) 
20.8690 
(20.8147) 
-4.999*** -2.597*** 4.390*** 
AGE 7.0474 
(7.0000) 
8.1607 
(8.0000) 
8.7879 
(8.0000) 
10.4127 
(10.0000) 
-4.455*** -10.603*** -16.003*** 
AGEN -0.0121 
(-0.0076) 
-0.0088 
(-0.0032) 
-0.0128 
(-0.0062) 
-0.0241 
(-0.0084) 
-1.604 -1.060 1.022 
TECH (%) 14.54 
(0.0000) 
10.71 
(0.0000) 
15.91 
(0.0000) 
6.35 
(0.0000) 
2.657*** -1.411 6.051*** 
ULTI (%) 63.51 
(100.0000) 
78.49 
(100.0000) 
76.07 
(100.0000) 
48.96 
(0.0000) 
-7.210*** -9.231*** 5.811*** 
DUAL (%) 14.44 
(0.0000) 
14.39 
(0.0000) 
13.46 
(0.0000) 
16.58 
(0.0000) 
0.032 0.976 -1.155 
BOARD 9.5059 
(9.0000) 
9.4417 
(9.0000) 
9.3563 
(9.0000) 
9.8413 
(9.0000) 
2.014** 2.887*** -2.451** 
INDEP (%) 24.97 
(33.33) 
23.56 
(33.33) 
22.16 
(33.33) 
13.92 
(0.0000) 
1.543 7.144*** 12.520*** 
*(**, ***) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. 
Variable definitions are given in Table 1.  
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Table 3. Cox regression results of three post-IPO outcomes: delisting, S–M&A, and W–M&A 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Cox(S-M&Ait =1∣Xit) Panel B: Dependent Variable - Cox(W-M&Ait =1∣Xit) Panel C: Dependent Variable - Cox(Delistedit =1∣Xit) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
OPRA 
0.0132 
(-1.35) 
2.7098* 
(1.53) 
0.0297 
(-1.09) 
7.0180 
(0.75) 
7.1465 
(0.74) 
7.2726 
(0.79) 
0.0502*** 
(-2.87) 
0.0646*** 
(-2.67) 
0.0499*** 
(-2.74) 
OCFA 
7.3560 
(1.14) 
7.4733 
(1.11) 
5.6623 
(0.95) 
5.2062 
(0.94) 
4.7246 
(0.88) 
2.4814 
(0.46) 
0.000589 
(-0.97) 
0.0005084 
(-1.00) 
0.0005483 
(-0.99) 
OFFSIZE 
0.9317 
(-0.42) 
0.8521 
(-0.82) 
1.0748* 
(1.58) 
0.8491*** 
(-3.70) 
0.4063*** 
(-2.93) 
0.4707** 
(-2.39) 
1.0277 
(0.24) 
1.0488 
(0.42) 
1.4019 
(0.66) 
RISK 
0.7023 
(-0.47) 
0.4731*** 
(-3.24) 
0.9478 
(-0.50) 
1.0039 
(0.35) 
1.0178 
(0.38) 
2.1177 
(0.76) 
1.4495*** 
(5.95) 
1.0931 
(1.24) 
1.4835*** 
(6.11) 
RETURN 
1.0053 
 (0.41) 
1.0148 
(0.45) 
1.0362 
(1.47) 
1.0866*** 
(7.04) 
1.0353*** 
(6.18) 
1.1110*** 
(8.85) 
1.3262*** 
(8.21) 
1.1904*** 
(5.17) 
1.1434*** 
(4.09) 
ROA 
1.0050 
(0.59) 
1.5420 
(0.35) 
1.0049 
(0.75) 
0.9989 
(-0.08) 
0.9544 
(-0.25) 
0.9835 
(-0.09) 
0.8013*** 
(-5.39) 
0.8964** 
(-2.51) 
0.9033** 
(-2.33) 
CUR 
1.0225* 
(1.39) 
1.0031 
(0.15) 
1.0183 
(1.06) 
0.7360** 
(-2.18) 
0.6633** 
(-2.35) 
0.9957 
(-0.24) 
0.9851 
(-0.36) 
0.9816 
(-0.40) 
0.9742 
(-0.55) 
LEV 
0.9988 
(-0.17) 
0.9961 
(-0.33) 
0.9974 
(-0.02) 
1.1287** 
(2.38) 
1.0151* 
(1.49) 
1.0160* 
(1.31) 
1.0125 
(0.55) 
1.0133 
(0.50) 
1.0136 
(0.52) 
B/M 
0.7620 
(-0.45) 
0.6624 
(-0.69) 
0.5960 
(-0.90) 
0.8049*** 
(-4.26) 
0.8311*** 
(-3.69) 
0.6423*** 
(-4.94) 
0.5395*** 
(-8.28) 
0.5161*** 
(-9.16) 
0.5176*** 
(-9.33) 
SIZE 
1.4691* 
(1.84) 
1.2331 
(0.90) 
1.1003** 
(2.00) 
1.7456** 
(2.46) 
1.2294** 
(2.06) 
1.8678*** 
(3.05) 
0.9853 
(-0.17) 
0.9976 
(-0.03) 
0.9462 
(-0.63) 
AGE 
0.9340 
(-1.45) 
0.9259 
(-1.56) 
0.9463 
(-1.26) 
0.9617 
(-0.94) 
0.9557 
(-1.05) 
0.9317 
(-1.34) 
0.8375*** 
(-8.97) 
0.9526** 
(-2.20) 
0.9687 
(-1.48) 
AGEN 
0.7304  
(-0.21) 
0.8214 
(-0.13) 
0.8667 
(-0.09) 
1.5609* 
(1.78) 
1.3178 
(1.10) 
1.4298* 
(1.37) 
1.6672 
(0.99) 
3.3822*** 
(2.58) 
3.0049** 
(2.09) 
TECH 
2.4702*** 
(2.68) 
2.2420** 
(2.37) 
 
1.1090 
(1.15) 
1.0803 
(0.86) 
 
0.4764*** 
(-3.36) 
0.5945** 
(-2.36) 
 
ULTI 
1.5522* 
(1.41) 
1.5278* 
(1.25) 
1.5434* 
(1.35) 
4.3639*** 
(4.29) 
4.1842*** 
(3.96) 
3.3818*** 
(3.49) 
0.6662*** 
(-2.99) 
0.4390*** 
(-5.92) 
0.4539*** 
(-5.65) 
DUAL 
 1.1011 
(0.78) 
1.1134 
(0.87) 
 
1.6258 
(1.39) 
1.1632* 
(1.56) 
 
1.1755 
(0.93) 
1.0620 
(0.34) 
BOARD 
 0.9721* 
(-1.46) 
0.9902 
(-0.46) 
 
1.0569*** 
(4.09) 
1.0367** 
(2.22) 
 
1.1099*** 
(4.22) 
1.1304*** 
(5.08) 
INDEP 
 0.6116 
(-0.16) 
0.1948 
(-0.58) 
 
0.0110* 
(-1.86) 
0.0159* 
(-1.68) 
 
0.0013 
(-0.70) 
0.0010 
(-0.74) 
D1 
  1.2714 
(1.19) 
  
1.1564 
(0.99) 
  
0.5333* 
(-1.73) 
D2 
  3.3468*** 
(5.52) 
  
3.3776*** 
(7.94) 
  
0.7364 
(-0.59) 
D3 
  1.6399*** 
(3.62) 
  
1.9839*** 
(7.19) 
  
2.0803*** 
(4.76) 
D4 
  0.3256*** 
(-3.13) 
  
1.4971*** 
(2.84) 
  
1.3484 
(1.22) 
Log likelihood -343.6653 -356.9119 -335.8130 -353.0820 -331.3821 -327.7450 -2206.8484 -1973.0827 -1937.6440 
LR Chi2(N) 21.61 24.04 36.62 77.84 78.48 85.78 238.32 638.90 709.78 
Hazard ratios and t-statistics in (parentheses) are reported.   
Model 1 presents the basic model without corporate governance attributes and industry sector. Model 2 presents results that consider corporate governance attributes including 
CEO duality, board size and board independence. Model 3 presents results that consider corporate governance attributes and industry sector.    
*(**, ***) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. 
Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
  
